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EC at Nice 9th December 2000 
Introduction 
The following paper is based on the author’s “Conditions and options for an autono-
mous ‘Common European Policy on Security and Defence’ in and by the European 
Union in the post-Amsterdam perspective opened at Cologne in June 1999“, written 
after the decisions by the European Council in June 1999 and published by the Center 
for European Integration Studies in Bonn.
1 In addition, it is supplemented by a new 
analysis of the problems raised by the later agreements in the context of the EU sum-
mit decisions at H elsinki and Nice on European security and defence policy, the Euro-
pean crisis reaction forces and the “Headline Goal” for their strength and composition. 
The question is asked, whether these decisions and guidelines as well as the Headline 
Goal for the forces meet the conditions posed by the European security situation, the 
requirements of  the European military contribution to Nato as well as those for an 
independent European military crisis response. This paper discusses the main aspects 
of the planned security, defence and crisis response policies in the limited European 
context against the background of crisis and conflict realities on the European periph-
 
1  See ZEI Discussion Paper C 54/1999. Lothar Rühl 
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ery and beyond. It deals in particular with six central issues and problems of a general 
nature: 
￿  the  issue of political-military structures and intergovernmental decision-
making in the EU, 
￿  the problem of force structuring between participants for military operations 
outside Nato, 
￿  the issue of standardisation, interoperability and readiness of crisis response 
forces, 
￿  the problem of “European options“ for independent use of EU forces in crisis 
and conflict, 
￿  the issue of “European Armed Forces“ and European military integration in the 
EU  - the problem of harmony in the Atlantic alliance for an enlarged “Euro-
pean role”. 
These six subjects are interrelated and must be seen in the general context. They are 
being dealt with in this discussion paper in three parts: 
I. The necessary political-military structures and political decision-making in the EU 
on security and defence policy for crisis response, including the requirements for 
flexibility in exercise of international missions and mandates under changing condi-
tions.  
II. The requirements for force structuring, including interoperability and standardisa-
tion, readiness of forces and sustainability of deployments in crisis contingencies as 
conditions for “European“ options of crisis response. 
III. The problems of harmony within the alliance, compatibility with US forces und of 
the creation of “European Armed Forces“ for a “European defence“ within the alliance 
as the hidden agenda behind the EC programme of 1999/2000. 
I.  Political-military structures and political decision-
making in the EU on security and defense policy 
for crisis response  
1. The decisions of the European Council on the planned common European security 
and defence policy at the end of the armed hostilities with Serbia over Kosovo in June 
1999 have made obvious the need for going beyond the original concept of the “Pe-
tersberg Tasks“ for the WEU, decided in 1992 in a different situation and later worked 
into the Amsterdam treaty, as well as further than the limited vision of the Maastricht 
and Amsterdam treaties on common European security policies. This is, however, not Structures, possibilities and limits of Europe 
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the purpose of the Helsinki and Nice decisions in the year 2000 by the EC nor the is-
sue addressed by the further decisions of the Foreign and Defence ministers of the EU 
partner states on force goals and general military missions for the European crisis 
reaction corps, to be created by 2003. The official European agenda is narrower than 
the tasks, which could, at least by the Balkan experience, confront the EU in case of 
American insistence on “European action“ for conflict prevention (one of the explicit 
missions in the “Petersberg Tasks“ and in the EU documents) and an ensuing escala-
tion of the crisis without US and Nato participation  - a contingency, which cannot be 
systematically e xcluded, certainly not in view of the ongoing American debate on the 
use of US forces in European crisis situations, i.e. in former Yugoslavia. Since the US 
ally is neither interested in a European “Nato light“ substitute for a robust “European 
Pillar“ within Nato nor in a separate European military organisation with its own 
force, duplicating Nato functions, but unable to replace Nato with US participation and 
dependent on Nato a ssets, while detracting resources and capabilities from Nato, a 
wider European responsibility with a larger military growth potential  has to be envis-
aged for the future. The problem h as been clearly posed by the Clinton and - recently 
at Munich in the International Security Conference February 2001  - by the Bush II 
Administration in the statement made by Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld 
(3.2.01). Washington has held a continuous “red line“ not to be crossed by the “Euro-
pean Security and Defence Identity“ in delimiting itself by its own military forces 
from Nato or even within Nato from the integrated “Allied Command Europe“: No 
duplication, no detraction from Nato c apabilities. Priority for Nato missions and for 
allied military capabilities.  
The European Nato allies do not question this priority nor the necessity for meaningful 
consultation with the US within Nato on possible separate European crisis manage-
ment operations outside Nato. They adhere to the principle “Nato first“, which also 
means, that Nato in a crisis in Europe would, as a matter of fact, have “the first 
choice“ for intervening in the situation with its allied forces, and this with active par-
ticipation of the European allies as in the Balkan contingencies, with “the collective 
Nato missions“ there, cited as examples , as did Nato Secretary General George 
Robertson at Munich in his statement on 3rd February 2001, mentioning, that “the US 
maintains only 15 percent of the total peacekeeping force committed in the Balkans - a 
far cry from the preponderance one might expect“. while French Defence Minister 
Alain Richard promised (on the same occasion and date) that “the European capac-
ity...will enrich the range of tools available to the transatlantic community for crisis 
management“.    
If this is really to be the case, the EU needs for joint military action in support of i n-
ternational peace and security not only autonomous military structures and capabilities 
for the use of European forces as well as procedures for independent decision-making Lothar Rühl 
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in time of crisis, but fore- most the political commitment to build up and maintain the 
necessary military forces at the required level of operational capabilities and profes-
sional quality,  including the technical assets and stocks of arms, munitions and equip-
ment. This requirement can only be met by a responsible and coherent political author-
ity at the highest level, independent from the North Atlantic Council. Otherwise, “stra-
tegic autonomy“, as the political goal is sometimes called, could not be achieved vis-à-
vis Nato and the United States, which means that the EU could only become a true 
“global player“ in international politics and security on this essential condition: Cen-
tral political (intergovernmental) authority on security and defence with the ultimate 
responsibility for the decisions on crisis response and the commitment of forces, made 
available by the member states after agreement in Nato with the non-EU allies. Com-
mon commitment for joint action under European command and control, if there is no 
joint Nato/EU operation under Nato command and control (to be exercised in this case 
by the European Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe, as envisaged in the of-
ficial documents). 
For t he sake of argument, it is supposed that the European Council of Chiefs of State 
and Government can provide this authority. It is, however, not certain that this author-
ity can be discharged in a timely and effective way in a sudden crisis. But such deci-
sions are always subject to circumstances and the political constellations including the 
domestic situation of each national government. There may be political constraints to 
acting early in a crisis or to commit the necessary forces for fear of risks to them and 
for fear of losses in action. These are legitimate concerns for any government and 
parliament, but the may jeopardise precisely the timely action and frustrate the 
political goals set by European security policy. For this reason, the Heads of State and 
Government must be personally involved in the political assessment of a crisis, in the 
risk-taking and the d ecision-making from the beginning. This means that the European 
Council of the EU must be able and willing to deal with a crisis at an early stage and 
must be sufficiently informed, assisted and advised to do so. This political priority has 
consequences for the procedures and organisms the EU needs, to be effective for crisis 
management. This has not been so in the past, the most recent past of the Kosovo con-
flict included. The international examples, the Gulf War, the Somalia Crisis, the Bos-
nian War and the Kosovo Conflict have clearly shown that not only international o r-
ganisations such as the UN or the OSCE are hard put to react both timely and force-
fully to meet the challenge, but that the member states themselves find it difficult to 
respond by action in good time to prevent the crisis from escalating or to limit the con-
flict by appropriate measures, if and when sanctions and demonstrations of force r e-
main ineffective. Vis-à-vis the Yugoslav conflict from 1991 to 1995 and again in 
1998-99 in the Kosovo crisis EU policies for a negotiated settlement by compromise 
were ineffective,  EU responses were weak, belated and inappropriate for the solution 
of the problem, that had to be a ddressed. The reasons for this continued failure are Structures, possibilities and limits of Europe 
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known: There was no agreement b etween the European governments on either the 
nature of the conflict and the gravity of the crisis situation in each case or on the nec-
essary and available means to em-ploy, let alone on the political objective to be per-
sued and hence on the preferred outcome of any concerted European effort towards 
conflict resolution. There was no strategy and not even a concept shared by all the EU 
members  on how to deal with the situation. Therefore, no European action beyond 
communiqué rhetoric, procedural proposals for a diplomatic moderation to reduce the 
tension between adversaries or for compromise solutions by mediation with a political 
impact on the  crises and a chance of success, came under way. This was particularly 
obvious in the approach to and the dealings with the Bosnian crisis in late 1991 and 
later in 1992-95 with the Bosnian War. Outstanding examples were the failed Carring-
ton initiative with a conference between the parties to the Yugoslav war of secession 
and the beginning Bosnian civil war without agreed results and the Western plan for 
the division of Bosnia, put forward by the Anglo-American mediators. 
The reasons were many, above all the refusal on the part of the warring parties to 
come to terms for a territorial compromise. But the obvious reluctance of the Western 
governments, to commit forces for an eventual intervention to block escalation of the 
armed violence and military confrontations on the ground in over four long years, 
convinced the adversaries in Yugoslavia that no outside actor would step in to separate 
them and end the armed conflicts. Thus, the lack of deterrence power, which is as 
much of a psychological as of a physical nature, left the Western governments without 
a credible alternative to diplomacy  - and as Henry Kissinger had remarked when try-
ing to mediate between Israel and the Arab enemies of the Yom Kippur War in 1973, 
“diplomacy without the sword is without an alternative“, hence powerless and without 
influence on determined opponents. In terms of strategy: If there is no capability for 
appropriate military sanction in case of refusal to come to negotiated terms, there is no 
deterrence. Policy is deprived of the option for punitive action, hence diplomacy of  
the ultimate means of persuasion. This applied fully to Yugoslavia and in particular to 
Bosnia. As to the EC partners with their long-standing “European Political Coopera-
tion“ (EPC) for concerted action in international affairs, they were unable to agree on 
more than principles and procedures or to forever demand cease-fires, although in the 
end of the day 123 of those concluded were broken again or simply disregarded by the 
local combatants. Their institutional weakness was lack of unity and lack of resolve. 
During the French referendum campaign over the Maastricht treaty in the midth of the 
Bosnian catastrophe, with French, British, Dutch and Italian troops prominently e n-
gaged in Bosnia for the failing UN peace-keeping mission, the then French Foreign 
Minister, Roland Dumas, ventured the argument (in a debate on French TV), that if the 
Maastricht treaty with its clause on the European foreign and security policy had been 
in effect in 1992, the Bosnian War might  have been prevented or ended by a joint Lothar Rühl 
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European initiative. At that time, the European governments, with Paris as leading 
example, tried to temporise in order not to commit armed forces for decisive action, 
which would have meant offensive operations in B osnia, and were even divided over 
the dropping of relief goods by parachute to the besieged enclaves of Szrebrenica and 
Tuzla, cut off on land by the Serbs. French general Morrillon, in command in the re-
gion for the UN “protection force“, publicly advised  against such relief from the air 
for fear of provoking the Serbs to shoot at the transport aircraft and escalating the 
situation on the ground. “Escalation“ was the sum of all fears to the European partners, 
and this to the extreme that at the moment of the Croat and Muslim offensives in 
Western Bosnia in the summer of 1995, which turned the tide of the war against the 
Serbs and offered a new opportunity for ending the conflict be resolute armed inter-
vention on the ground and from the air, the German Defence Minister Volker Rühe 
declared that “the worst“ that could happen and must therefore be avoided, was “esca-
lation“ of the war. This political opinion on the state of the Bosnian conflict and the 
issue of military escalation from the outside, flew in the face of the evidence on the 
ground, which strongly suggested only military power, brought to bear by the allies 
against the Serbs, could finally end this devastating war, which had escalated  since 
1992 after almost four years and 300.000 dead victims with u p to three million dis-
placed persons. On this crucial point of policy and strategy in conflict, all the Euro-
pean governments agreed with the German defence minister, who had stated the con-
ventional wisdom of Europe on war, conflict limitation and risk-taking in crisis. This 
misunderstanding of both the situation and the strategy of controlled escalation by 
military intervention to end the war (which was done a few weeks later by Nato under 
American leadership with allied air attacks from Italy and the d eployment of an allied 
rapid reaction force, composed of British, French and Dutch combat troops, close to 
Sarajevo) shows the real problem of policy-making and reaching common decisions 
on how to act in a difficult and dangerous situation:  
Policy-making in c risis always means acting under the pressure of events, which may 
be beyond control or may be used to advantage, with time for measured responses 
running out fast. 
For this reason, governments find themselves close to the cutting edge of power to be 
used i n order to make an impact on the situation and confronted with considerable 
risks to the success of their crisis response, to their forces engaged in conflict and even 
to their own political situation at home. This applied to the allied governments in 
1993-95 and again over the Kosovo in 1998-99 as it applied to the UN and the EU 
from the b eginning of the wider Balkans crisis in 1991 with Yugoslavia dissolving in 
four wars of secession against the central Serb authority in Belgrade. It has to be re-
called that at the beginning , in early 1991, the Luxemburg foreign minister Poos, then 
in the chair of the intergovernmental EC “troika“ presidency, addressed the developing Structures, possibilities and limits of Europe 
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crisis as an occasion for European political initiatives to settle a conflict in Europe, 
and called out “the hour of Europe“ to act. His assessment was quite right, but the EC 
partners could neither act individually as European Powers, as France and Britain 
might have done, at least initially, nor as a group of states or a “community“ , for lack 
of agreement and of ready forces to be used in a joint military intervention to prevent a 
war from spreading to Bosnia. Europe as a whole was unable to enforce either UN 
resolutions or the rules of the CSCE. Russia was threatening to block any vote in the 
UN World Security Council which would authorise the use of force against Yugosla-
via or the Bosnian Serbs, the CSCE (later OSCE) was dependent on unanimity; it had 
no mandate before the end of 1994 and no means or organisation before 1996 to act as 
provider of security in a crisis situation and still has no right to intervene in member 
countries or any foreign territory. The West European Union (WEU), while present 
with a flotilla in the Adriatic to o bserve compliance with the UN embargo on arms, 
military  equipments and oil to Yugoslavia, did not have the military means to do more, 
and its members did not want to engage further. The EU, at that time still the old EC 
with its intergovernmental political cooperation in international affairs and an elabo-
rate,  well-organised consultation mechanism, lacked a political objective, a strategy 
for success, the means to carry it out and the coherence to act effectively. 
2. This inability, prolonged beyond 1995 to 1999 with the Kosovo affair, shows that 
the main problem of policy-making and decision-taking lies with the national govern-
ments and legislatures, not with the EU as such, since there is no European supra-
national political authority with competence and responsibility for security and d e-
fence, let alone with j urisdiction over armed forces and  “European“ military opera-
tions. This basic problem of political authority and responsibility for international a c-
tion cannot be solved by organisation and procedures, by diplomatic consultations and 
by committees, since i t is first and above all not a management problem but one of 
political vision, unity and resolve. The other side of this case  also proves the point: 
When the resolve was there in late summer of 1995, three or four governments agreed 
to send troops t ogether to fight and all the allies agreed in Nato to commit the air 
power assembled in Italy to end the war. This led to the armed mediation by the US at 
Dayton and to the Paris Peace for Bosnia. The EU was indirectly represented in the 
Dayton negotiations by three of its members, but it was no actor itself. For Dayton no 
set-up of committees and consultation procedures was necessary nor was there time to 
do it in. Understandings between “the able and willing“ on the ad hoc tasks and the 
appropriate means at their disposal was all, what was needed. The interallied ad hoc-
coalition organised itself in a practical manner without relying on either EU or Nato 
procedures or committee machinery. Russia was engaged for the negotiation by the 
US, without which nothing would have been accomplished. To end the Kosovo war in 
June 1999 the EU was useful, but again it was represented by the governments, and 
the European Council acted more as an international Notary Public to enregister the Lothar Rühl 
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provisional solutions negotiated by others, i.e. the US and Russia, endorsed by the G-8 
Summit and presented to Europe without an alternative as they had been presented to 
Belgrade by a “take it or leave it“  challenge in the form of an “ultimate proposal“ un-
der the threat of continued air attacks on a widening scale and with an increasing i n-
tensity of bombing. It is true that the Finnish President represented the EU as partner 
to the mediation in Belgrade, which was based on an international position, hammered 
out mainly by the US in negotiations with a recalcitrant Russia, itself outmanoeuvred 
and isolated, even by China, at the UN and marginalized in Europe by the dual track 
advance of Nato towards the East with the extension of the treaty area and towards the 
South East on the Balkans with  the e ngagement of  allied forces, establishing Nato 
military structures, offering security and defence guarantees to neighbours of Serbia 
and creating a political-military prefiguration of a Nato sphere of interest wide beyond 
the former Yugoslavia, englobing virtually all of South Eastern Europe.  
3. It stands to reason, that Nato’s part in the ending of the acute Kosovo crisis and in 
stabilising both Macedonia and Montenegro, controlling Albania and the Kosovo i t-
self, was more important to the provisional conflict resolution than that of the EU. It is 
equally obvious that the European governments at that time had a common political 
interest in acting together for peace in Europe by helping to end the conflict and to 
demonstrate European initiative, which w as done at Cologne with the “Stability Pact 
for South-Eastern Europe“. The decision on the common security and defence policy, 
which had been prepared since 1998, i.e. by the Franco-British initiative of St. Malo in 
December, was timely to put the EU on the political map of Europe and on the Euro-
pean security agenda after the participation of most of its members in the Nato opera-
tion “Allied Force“. The Cologne Summit decision on security and defence policy for 
the EU was a logical, even a compelling conclusion to the chain of events on the Bal-
kans and in the “transatlantic partnership“ since the beginning of the Balkan conflict in 
1991/92. It was the consequence of the Kosovo experience with Nato in action under 
US leadership and control, if the EU was to come into existence as a “global player“ at 
all. 
But the entire experience concerned mostly the allied governments in Nato, which 
were related to each other in ever wider circles of active participation in decision-
making before and during the conflict: The first or “inner“ circle consisting only of the 
US and Britain as in the Gulf War, a second one with France as the third partner, a 
third with Italy and Germany as deployment countries for the US and Nato aircraft in 
Europe, a ctive participants in the “air campaign“ with valuable assets and as “Dayton 
partners“ of the “International Contact Group“ (its membership extended to Italy and 
its scope beyond Bosnia onto the entire Balkans) for the diplomatic operation as addi-
tional associates in auxiliary roles, f inally the “outer“ circle of all Nato partners, repre-
sented by the permanent Nato council in Brussels under the chairmanship of the Secre-Structures, possibilities and limits of Europe 
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tary General, who was directly connected to Washington and to the US Commander-
in-Chief in Europe as the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), who com-
manded operation “Allied Force“ in his H.Q. at Mons. The heads of the national dele-
gations acted on their instructions from home (and several of the Heads of State or 
Government used their direct contacts to the President in Washington). The rest of the 
Nato political-administrative machinery in the political H.Q. in Brussels was only i n-
volved at the consultative level and had to present the operation to the public. The en-
tire set-up offered a fair example of classic coalition warfare, as the “solidarity b e-
tween allies“ and the “cohesion of the alliance“ were constantly invoked by the Nato 
authorities as the overriding concern. In the end, general Wesley Clark resumed the 
success of the military strategy and operational tactics, imposed by his political mas-
ters on operation „Allied Force“, with the sober assessment, that it worked and that it 
had “maintained alliance cohesion“, one of the four objectives of the “air campaign“
2. 
4. The Balkan example is no argument against proper procedures of consultation and 
decision-taking nor against the organisation, without which no common policy-making 
is possible in the long run between a dozen let alone two or three dozen governments. 
But it shows that organisation and procedure cannot replace political union and author-
ity, policy and strategy. It also shows that coalitions between partner states and at least 
an internal “balance of power“ still exist within the Western institutions, both in Nato 
and in the EU as they exist at the UN a nd in the OSCE. Intra-alliance and intra-
community policies may act on a pattern of strategies of limited conflict of national 
interests on major policy issues such as going to war together or simply applying pres-
sure on other countries or intervening in a  hostile environment. Finally it shows that 
the d eclared political solidarities and hence the formal structures and boundaries of 
treaty a reas between partner states in the EU as in Nato can be stretched, over-
extended and over-ridden by understandings of  some of the members with each other 
and with states outside, accepted as external partners in ad hoc coalitions for special or 
dominant purposes in a given situation, as was the case with Russia both in 1995 over 
Bosnia and in 1999 over the Kosovo. This pattern is apt to re-emerge in international 
crisis management and conflict resolution in the future, whenever the stakes are high 
and the odds ominous, and, of course, when it would be necessary “to engage Russia“ 
in the common security interest, one day possibly China outside Europe and certainly, 
for the EU in operations outside Nato on the European periphery, Turkey  - which 
means that the e ntire European discussion on the “European Security and Defence 
Identity“ with the proclaimed “Common European Policy on Security and Defence“ is 
in reality subject to the American connection and to Turkey as it is on Norway for con-
 
2  See Politische Studien, Hanns Seidel Stiftung, München, 4/2000, Die USA und 
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tingencies in Northern Europe. Cross-influences will play across the outer borders of 
the EU as they will across the Nato boundaries, wherever these boundaries will be. 
EU structures will, therefore, have to be flexible, if they are to hold the still loose but 
widening union together in international action and if they are to withstand the pres-
sures of crisis from the outside and of dissent from the inside. They must provide for 
active participation of European Nato allies, which are not members of the EU, but are 
in a geo-strategic position, which could not circumvened for a crisis response opera-
tion by EU forces. This is a critical point in relation with Turkey and a possible cause 
for intra-alliance controversy also with the US. A conflict on this point could paralyse 
any military response by the EU on the Southern periphery of Europe or in the Black 
Sea region. It could block Nato consent to the use of Nato force and command struc-
tures, Nato bases and other Nato assets by the EU for outside purposes.  
5. The common foreign, security and defence policy, especially all crisis management 
and conflict control policies with the use of force or even only of certain military 
means such as transport aircraft, relief convoys on the ground or teams for water drill-
ing, road/bridge and power-line reparation, mine-clearing, distribution of food and 
medical assistance in theatres of armed hostilities (such a s in Somalia or Bosnia and 
Kosovo), will remain concerted operations between national contingencies and ser-
vices, each one under the ultimate authority and the national jurisdiction of their r e-
spective governments. Hence the first and last word on such commitments, deploy-
ments and employments will be reserved for the national authorities as will be the 
military missions and the “rules of engagement“ to be agreed upon beforehand by the 
participating countries. On this capital point there will be political and ideological dif-
ferences from member to member, which becomes obvious when one considers the 
neutrality policies of some EU states such as Sweden and Austria outside Nato or the 
different constitutional regimes with the German one, even since 1994, still  a particu-
lar case. 
From the Nato experience the general lesson can be drawn, that by and large arising 
differences of opinion and even of national interests in crisis management can be over-
come or at least limited by mutual moderation. However, Nato ist a  military-political 
alliance, based on intergovernmental cooperation alone with the alliance o rganisation 
no independent entity but the prolongation of an alliance of sovereign states. This has 
established the pre-existing political hierarchy between the allies at the creation as the 
underlying reality of the transatlantic partnership including the “special relationship“ 
between the US and Britain (even if the latter has changed due to the loss of power 
and international influence of Britain in relation to t he US) and the Anglo-American 
predominance in Nato as a fact of life: The US as the protective power of Europe 
during the Cold War has remained the political leader and the moderator of the 
alliance. American strategic supremacy and technological-economic  superiority as Structures, possibilities and limits of Europe 
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materialised in the US forces and global military organisation above and beyond the 
transatlantic connection englobing Europe with the complete strategic control of Nato 
border on a benign hegemony, which is all but formally complete, determines alliance 
policies and strategy, even if the US could not rule Nato against the will of its Euro-
pean allies. The US-German relationship, grown out of West Germany’s dependence 
on American power and commitment for the defence of the FRG after 1945 and u ntil 
the end of the East-West confrontation, on America’s good will and political support 
for the national reunification of 1998/90, reinforces both the existing political hierar-
chy in Nato and the internal coalition politics within an inner circle around the US as 
the central power of the alliance, consisting of Britain, Germany and France (as far as 
the latter participates in Nato affairs) and, to a somewhat lesser degree, also of Italy as 
the other important basing-country for US forces in Europe and the central power in 
the Mediterranean.  
6. The Nato members in the international “Dayton group“ on South-Eastern Europe 
reflects this post-1990 situation in the alliance. Spain aspires to a similar position in 
the inner circle as that of Italy since 1996. Turkey however on the political margin in a 
geopolitical-strategic key position as one of the most important “strategic allies“ (Hol-
brooke in 1994) of the US for the control of Europe from the Mediterranean to the 
Black Sea and Caucasus in the North to the G ulf in the South. This set-up inside Nato 
is the hard core of the alliance as an international player. The formal equality of its 
sovereign members in treaty terms under international law is not operational in politi-
cal-strategic terms under crisis and conflict conditions. The nuclear side of reality 
again changes this set-up by privileging Britain and France among all European allies. 
But since nuclear arms are “weapons of last resort“ and with Soviet power gone, Rus-
sia geographically removed from the center of Europe and no forward defence neces-
sary against an immediate military threat on the continent, Nato strategy does no 
longer a ddress confrontation risks in Europe proper nor rely on ready nuclear forces 
for regional deterrence, the “nuclear status privilege“ is no longer of the same impor-
tance in favour of Britain and France. It is, however, still a political status symbol and 
offers the advantages of a privileged legal position in the NPT as a support of national 
veto power in the WSC of the UN. For the EU it has not been an obstacle to a common 
security policy so far. But as the EU develops into an inter-national unity of action, 
based on arrangements between its member states and lately on the union treaties, the 
nuclear issues of politics and strategy will come under consideration.  
Britain and France, already in a special position as secondary nuclear powers and 
privileged permanent members of the UN security council with veto power, used to 
military intervention policies outside Europe, reflecting  their past as centers of over-
seas colonial empires with still active clientele politics and interests in Africa and in 
the Middle East, can always rely on their special international status in reserving spe-Lothar Rühl 
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cial rights in the security and defence domain as well as for their relations with the US, 
Russia, China or India. 
In Nato these special situations are controlled by the dominant US interest in Europe 
and in control of alliance forces by US dominated Nato authorities, by US economic 
interests in the armaments markets and the Nato programmes on “standardisation“ of 
equipments for “inter-operability“ and improvement of allied forces (as has become 
clear again in the conclusions of the review “Lessons learnt“ from the operation “Al-
lied Force“ 1999 and the ensuing defence improvement initiative of Nato, to which all 
European allies have agreed in principle and have made commitments for force goals). 
The French restrictions on participation in the military cooperation in Nato diminish 
France’s position in Nato a nd limit French influence, thus indirectly upgrading the 
German position in the alliance. But outside Nato and in particular outside Europe 
France and Britain hold their post-Great Power positions above all other European al- 
lies and hence, their EU partners. What will this situation mean for EU structures and 
policy-making on crisis reaction and conflict prevention by the use of military forces? 
As far as the structures and procedures are concerned, the Nato example has been fol-
lowed by the architects of  the EU common security and defence policy. The Military 
Committee (MC) of Nato, composed on the highest level by the National Chiefs of 
Staff of the Armed Forces or Chiefs of the Defence Staff, with a working level in 
Brussels of Permanent Representatives  of these chiefs, and a permanent International 
Military Staff, military counterpart of the political Council in Permanent Session, 
which is composed by the heads of the national delegations to Nato (the so-called 
“Nato ambassadors“, representatives of their governments) has been copied. This had 
already been done for the reactivation of the WEU, where a military committee of 
permanent delegates (for some partners as in the German case the same general offi-
cers in double function) had been created. This pattern has been transferred to the EU, 
which now had its own MC and international Military Staff. The Political and Security 
Policy Committee of civil representatives of the governments has been set up accord-
ing to the Nato example of the permanent council. T he Secretary General and High 
Representative for the Security and Defence policy of the EU may sit in the chair of 
the committee. A situation center for crisis management as a political-military r e-
sponse and coordination cell has been added, in order to give the EU an operational 
crisis reaction capability. A strategic reconnaissance satellite center is to follow, in 
order to create the desired “independent“ European capability for the acquisition, e x-
ploitation and evaluation of strategic intelligence by space-based satellite systems in 
the common possession of the EU partners. 
All in all, this rudimentary and possibly provisional structure for the EU security and 
defence policy with the planning, coordination and control functions for a European 
crisis reaction force at the higher political-military level and down to the operational Structures, possibilities and limits of Europe 
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headquarters for the planning and command and control of force components deployed 
for and employed in non-Nato military missions in the service of the EU or by the EU 
for the UN or the OSCE appears to be adequate for the stated purpose of covering the 
entire spectrum of the 1992 “Petersberg Tasks“ for WEU, which have been assumed 
by the EU, reaching from humanitarian relief action with military and civil means via 
peace-keeping m issions with interposing troops to separate adversaries, deploy troops 
to secure open roads and free traffic under international control, police contested or 
unsafe areas, disarm opponents, neutralise threats to security, to peace enforcement 
with the use  of military force including combat operations to achieve the missions 
objective. 
This objective would be in general to extend protection and project stability in crisis 
situations to the advantage of the populations or the threatened legal authorities, pro-
tect or restore the internal peace of countries, to which EU forces would be deployed 
on request by the legal government with a mandate, possibly by the UN or the OSCE. 
Cases of  intervention by offensive use of armed force may arise, but such cases were 
not expressively included in the 1992 Petersberg missions for WEU forces. They may, 
however, emerge as the consequence of a peace-keeping operation or even, as in So-
malia, of a humanitarian relief mission, which would have to be protected or con-
ducted by a  military force of the EU, running into armed resistance or being attacked 
for booty. The objective of the mission could, therefore, require not only defensive but 
counter-offensive use of force including of heavy arms, i.e. to overcome road blocks, 
to cross a river under fire, to break a siege or an encirclement by a hostile armed oppo-
sition, in order to go on with a relief convoy. Missions may change by themselves u n-
der the influence of unforeseen events. 
Therefore, the political and the military structures of the EU security and defence 
group from the European Council (EC) to the Foreign Ministers Council, eventually 
completed by the De-fence Ministers, down to the Political and Security Committee 
and the Military Committee with its Military Staff  must be prepared, organised and 
staffed to be capable of swift decisions for a timely and effective crisis response - this 
is the whole reason for the entire operation and the ambitious EU programme for a 
common security and defence policy outside Nato in non-Nato contingencies. Obvi-
ously, here lies the critical point, on which everything would turn in an acute crisis and 
during an ongoing, protracted conflict with EU forces or force components engaged in 
their missions. In this point the procedures are important  for speedy decisions on ac-
tion after fixing the objectives, which can be achieved with the available means in 
time for a successful outcome, evaluating the risks and defining which would be a c-
ceptable, the same for costs and eventual losses, elaborating an exit-strategy which 
would not confound the purpose of an operation and frustrate the political aims.  Lothar Rühl 
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7. One essential consideration is when the heads of governments should be involved, 
since ministers cannot decide for themselves on military force, sanctions or other 
means of pressure. In the EU foreign policy domain, the political directors of the min-
istries of foreign affairs are the key figures for consultations on important matters and 
for submitting decisions to their ministers. Any safe procedure must include, not b y-
pass them. The participation of the defence ministers will be necessary on any decision 
to commit military forces or assets, to deploy troops abroad and to use foreign bases, 
whether inside Nato or outside. Without the defence ministers n o meaningful agree-
ment on allied forces and joint force structures is possible, and without the defence 
ministers the d efence budget cannot be loaded with additional costs for deployments 
and operations added for international security or foreign policy reasons. The defence 
part of the new policy cannot be managed or decided upon by the foreign ministers. 
Since military or “hard“ security is always linked to the use of force and to defence 
considerations, it is a capital error not to associate the defence m inisters on a perma-
nent basis with the foreign ministers in the ministerial council on security policy. In 
this respect, the EC has failed in his self-given task of setting up an appropriate struc-
ture for political decisions on security and defence. As long as the foreign ministers 
may decide on their own, when to consult with the defence ministers and call them in 
for a common session of the council, their deliberations on the military aspects of cri-
sis management and conflict prevention or termination will be too far off from practi-
cal military and technical considerations and tend to make “incremental employment“ 
decisions of the kind that commits forces piecemeal, with light arms be preference, in 
small units, with narrowly limited missions and rules of  engagement, forcing them to 
allow themselves to be fired upon first if not attacked outright with deadly use of arms 
and bound to irrealistic perceptions of danger and threat in the theatre of crisis as well 
as to an interpretation of international law to  the disadvantage of regular forces e x-
posed to guerrilla fighters or street fighting and sniping, road-blocking and harassing 
military posts and camps. 
Too restrictive mandates or interpretations of rules of engagement and rules of interna-
tional law by the  lawyers of the foreign services and diplomatic representatives have 
led to the self-inflicted debacle of UNPROFOR in Bosnia between 1992 and 1995. 
“Incremental“ engagement of forces with the mission to control a crisis situation a l-
ways carries a non-calculable risk against unknown, often hidden odds and in situa-
tions, which may change rapidly and hence confront the deployed international troops 
with a violent runaway crisis, with which they later cannot catch up, so that the one-
sided escalation of the conflict escapes their grasp, piles up serious risks to their opera-
tions at little cost to the authors of organised violence, inflicts losses without any real 
chance of eliminating the source of danger let alone of establishing control. The Brit-
ish and French  contingents of UNPROFOR together lost more than 70 men dead with-
out any decisive action. This is why the international “protection“ force in Bosnia Structures, possibilities and limits of Europe 
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could not even effectively protect itself, let alone the populations and localities under 
their responsibility for security. 
8. The defence ministers and chiefs of the armed forces bear the responsibility (in Ger-
many the constitutional responsibility of the minister as commander-in-chief) for the 
forces and their soldiers vis-à-vis the government and the parliament, but ultimately 
before the people. No foreign minister can replace them in this and the foreign minis-
tries do not have the competence and expertise to analyse a situation from an 
operational point of view, evaluate the risks, the requirements and the cost of an opera-
tion, least at all of a belated or weak response in a developing crisis, where the odds 
are against the insertion of forces without the necessary strength, sup-port and supplies 
over a longer stretch of time. There are no safe “preventive deployments“ of forces in 
a theatre of crisis, where an armed conflict may erupt and the “prevention“ force has 
the task of suppressing the forces of violence in time before they can act. It follows 
from there, that the foreign ministers cannot make an assessment alone, whether a 
given potential crisis situation warrants only a small and light force for “preventive 
deployment“ or whether a stronger and heavier armed force should be deployed as a 
matter of caution to be able to keep the causes for an eruption  of conflict under con-
trol. This is, anyway, one of the most difficult and most risky decisions to make at the 
beginning of an involvement. “Policy“ decisions cannot be safely dissociated from 
military “strategy“ decisions and from operational-tactical considerations of imple-
mentation, since the execution of policy determines success or failure and the “mission 
impossible“ for armed forces often results from a constraining mandate for the incre-
mental use of light forces in situations, that have been ill observed or perceived by the 
political authorities and their diplomatic advisers, where the risks have been underes-
timated by the policy-makers. After Bosnia for the UN, the Kosovo has offered les-
sons to Nato and to the allied governments, advised and represented by their Nato am-
bassadors and the secretary general of Nato in the permanent council: Their assess-
ments and evaluations before the implementation of the exclusive air strategy of “Al-
lied Force“ in March 1999 were proven inaccurate and on the time axis wide off the 
mark. Their predictions of how Milosevic would react to the “phased“ air campaign 
and what it would take to bend or break him were wrong, and their interpretations of 
the Serb reasoning during the conflict was not better. It is true, that they had ample 
military advise in Brussels and in their capitals, which they listened too, once the 
armed hostilities were opened. But before that, during the political phase of crisis 
management by diplomacy and with the OSCE observers in Kosovo, while preventive 
force deployments were made in Macedonia across the border and the “Extraction 
Force“ was assembled there to evacuate the observers in case of a threat to their secu-
rity, the allied governments via the EU “troika“, did not persuade Milosevic to change 
his policy nor did they bring him to honour the various agreements they had made Lothar Rühl 
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with him. All missions failed, finally the Holbrooke mission in the fall of 1998 and 
ultimatums were not followed up with the threatened military action. 
The former chairman  of the Nato Military Committee, German general Klaus 
Naumann, who with general Wesley Clark negotiated in October 1998 in Belgrade 
with Milosevic the withdrawal of the bulk of Serbian forces from Kosovo and tried 
during the ultimate last mission to Belgrade in January 1999 to persuade Milosevic to 
comply with the Western five demands for a settlement of the Kosovo, has criticised 
the Western “crisis management“ in 1998-99 before the break-down of the Ram-
bouillet negotiation. He has argued that the spring of 1998, when the escalation of vio-
lence started in the Kosovo, would probably have been “the right point in time to show 
resolve“, but at that time, “many Nato countries looked upon the situation as an inter-
nal affair“ (and the US was bound into a severe internal constitutional crisis over 
President Clinton). Therefore, the crisis management missed the proper opportunity, 
when escalation into war with Serbia over Kosovo might still have been avoided.
3 
General Naumann has drawn as lesson from the failed Kosovo diplomacy before 
March 1999 that “crisis management can achieve its primary objective to avoid war 
only by winning the initiative early and if possible by preventive action“
4. 
“Winning the initiative“ is more than taking an initiative. It is a strategic  term which 
means that the object of the initiative is to deny the opponent to set the conditions of 
the conflict, to reduce his freedom of action until he is blocked from reaching his goals 
and secure freedom of action for oneself in order to determine the evolution of the 
conflict and finally its outcome. “Winning the initiative“ is about winning control of 
the situation by bringing superiority over the adversary to bear. For any coalition or 
alliance, hence for the EU as a community of states, the lesson  for its crisis manage-
ment policies is to bring in sufficient military force early, at least on stand-by, ready to 
be deployed and engaged, capable of a sustained effort to exercise physical and tech-
nical control of the crisis situation and impose the conditions of conflict prevention, 
conflict limitation or conflict termination, in sum: establish strategic dominance of the 
theatre. This basic requirement limits the time for “incrementalism“ and sets the stage 
for a timely deployment of a military force or p ara-military police force (or both t o-
gether). 
8. EU security structures and forces for crisis response must be tailored to this r e-
quirement. This asks for a standing combination of political-diplomatic and military 
expertise for the early recognition of danger, proper use of the available warning time 
for analysis and assessment of the situation, the correlation of forces and risks of ac-
 
3  See Klaus Naumann, Kosovo  - Modell für die Zukunft?, In: Erich Reiter, Der 
Krieg um das Kosovo 1998/99, Mainz 2000, p. 24. 
4  Ibid., p. 25. Structures, possibilities and limits of Europe 
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tion before the crisis erupts into open violence and escalates into armed conflict. The 
examples of Bosnia and Kosovo, discussed above under this aspect, are cases in point 
???. The EU authorities and associate governments should mind these examples and 
use the experience for the architecture of their security and defence policy: A closely 
knit fabric of cooperation between f oreign affairs and defence with the intelligence 
and security services across administrative departments and political domains as well 
as across the national frontiers between the participating countries. This consideration 
clearly pleads for both a common council for the foreign and defence ministers and a 
standing committee with representatives from both as well as for a permanent inter-
change between the PSC and the MC with the Military Staff under the authority of the 
Secretary General/High Representative for Security and Defence Policy of the EU. In 
this political-military context the crisis response cell and the situation center would 
give optimal service to the process of assessment and policy-making for eventually 
necessary preventive deployments in s upport of preventive diplomacy and the intro-
duction of military force into the equation of the means for action. The Military Staff 
could coordinate its „strategic planning“ with the policy planning, based on the same 
intelligence and on a joint assessment by exploitation of the results of „early warning“. 
This is necessary on any account, since the MS figures in the EC document Annex to 
the Conclusions of the Presidency on the Nice EC session 7/9-11-2000
5) as “linkage“ 
between the EUMC (the military committee and the military forces, made available to 
the EU, and as advisory organism of the competent authorities of the EU, i.e. the Po-
litical and Security Committee, the Secretary General, the Council of Ministers of For-
eign Affairs and ultimately the EC of the Heads of State and Government. 
9. Any architecture or assemblage of structures for political decision-making, military 
planning and coordination of forces , elaboration of crisis response options both politi-
cal and economic as well as military must provide for the participation of non-EU al-
lies and of willing candidates for EU membership, once these are recognized and asso-
ciated to EU political consultations or even in a formal partnership with the EU. It 
must at the same time secure the integrity and autonomy of EU planning, decision-
making and the implementation of political decisions and strategic plans by the EU 
organisation for security and defence, i.e. for crisis response. This subject is an old 
theme of the relations between Nato and Russia since 1994 with Moscow always de-
manding more access than Brussels can give, if Nato is to continue as an efficient mili-
tary-political alliance, capable of international action by itself and not hindered by 
others. This principle of self-determination in crisis a nd crisis response even in coop-
eration with external security partners should be valid for the EU as well. Otherwise 
the EU Security and Defence Policy organisation would risk to degenerate into a sec-
ond OSCE without impact on hard security problems. For all candidates to EU mem-
 
5  See SN 400/00 ADD 1 Rev 1, p. 77 (German version). Lothar Rühl 
  20
bership, which would not yet be Nato members in case of a crisis contingency, the 
same criteria for autonomy and integrity of the EU as an international player in secu-
rity matters must apply. Otherwise the EU would acquire a loose fringe of associated 
and participating partners, not really bound by solidarity and discipline on the basis of 
contractual obligations and an “acquis commun“ of common practice in the exercise of 
policies in the international field. 
II.  The force structuring and the options for Euro-
pean crisis response with military means 
1. The adopted “Headline Goal“ for EU crisis reaction forces, based on the “Peters-
berg Tasks“ for the WEU in 1992, sets a requirement for some 115.000 soldiers in 
ground forces, of which not more than 60.000 in one contingency force, 300 combat 
aircraft and 75 naval vessels plus a airlift/sealift capability of 188 transport airplanes 
and 61 transport ships for longer range deployments in the contingency of use of force 
with possible combat missions. Such a contingency could materialize in a situation, 
where the mission would be “separation of parties by force“, in other words: deploy-
ment of an interposition force to separate two adversaries, opposing each other on the 
terrain. This is supposed to be the most demanding of the “Petersberg Tasks“ for EU 
forces, the others being “conflict prevention“ i.e. preventive deployment of troops in a 
crisis area and “humanitarian assistance“, which has two parts: “humanitarian aid“ (as 
in Southern Turkey to Kurdish refugees from Northern Iraq in the spring of 1991, in 
Eastern Bosnia or in Somalia) and “evacuation operation“ (as in Northern Iraq in 1991 
or from flooded or devastated areas). The national contingents announced by the par-
ticipating countries in 2000 for the “Helsinki Force Catalogue“ (HFC) added up to 
more than 100.000 soldiers for ground forces, 400 combat aircraft und 100 naval ves-
sels. Non-EU states, which are members of Nato, and therefore admitted to participate 
in EU “Petersberg Task“ operations, announced additional force contributions in N o-
vember 2000 at Helsinki. This means that on the quantitative scale the force require-
ments are already fulfilled on paper. As to military quality, which is recognized as the 
essential criterion, the well known deficiencies in European Nato forces subsist and 
limit the operational value of the commitments made by the concerned EU partners at 
Helsinki: Strategic transport, strategic reconnaissance, command and control capabili-
ties, logistical support over larger distances, readiness of units, combat search and res-
cue (CSAR) assets, precision-guided munitions (PGM) and other high accuracy weap-
ons such as air-to-ground, ground-to-ground, sea-to-surface missiles, orientation and 
target acquisition equipment etc. In  Nato, the military authorities and the US defence 
minister have identified additional deficiencies in Allied Forces Europe after the Kos-
ovo operation: In general terms standardisation and interoperability of the various n a-
tional components of allied forces, i.e. in telecommunications, communications secu-Structures, possibilities and limits of Europe 
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rity, intelligence assets and analysis, electronical surveillance and air-space control, 
friend/foe-identification of flying aircraft and night combat capabilities in the air and 
on the ground. The “Defence  Capabilities Initiative“ (DCI) adopted in Nato by all al-
lies has identified the deficiencies in detail and spelled out the remedies. It has also 
been adopted by the EU partners as the yard-stick for measuring military requirements 
for the EU force. On November 20, 2000 the participating EU governments accepted a 
list of initiatives for upgrading EU crisis r esponse force components and the European 
organisation to be set up. The system of division of labour by sharing roles was 
adopted, in order to avoid duplications and optimise European options by joint capa-
bilities. The results need to be verified for eventual correction or completion. Judging 
by past experience with European efforts in the defence domain, perfection is not to be 
expected but adequate results could be achieved. 
2. The weak point in the political-administrative architecture lies in the absence of the 
Finance Ministers or at least the budget directors of the finance ministries and in the 
failure to create a Committee on Technology, Arms and E quipment, composed of the 
armaments directors in the national defence ministries. But these errors could be cor-
rected, since cooperation in the armaments domain with the harmonisation of planning 
and procurement of military equipments is an explicit objective of the new European 
Security and Defence Policy and a measure of practical cooperation does exist. If the 
political will prevailed to build up a solid European crisis response capability with 
military force, which could indeed “enrich“ (in the words of the French Defence Min-
ister) the collection of tools for crisis reaction and conflict prevention/ termination 
and, at the same time, address the tasks of the Nato DCI with results, that could satisfy 
the military authorities of Nato and above all the US,  the structural deficiencies in the 
concept of Helsinki and Nice could well be eliminated. 
The synergetic effects of European force structuring and Nato force goals in the new 
allied forces structure, to be organised in Europe, could materialise by the build-up of 
the multilateral “Eurocorps“, to which France contributes forces together with Ger-
many, Spain, Belgium and other allies, however some of them only with token forces 
of dubious availability let alone operational readiness, to a full-fledged Nato “crisis 
reaction corps“, in this case the 3rd one of high readiness, with the “Franco-German 
Brigade“ (at this time the only immediately available one in the corps) as the “spear-
head“ of a rapid crisis reaction force. This will be effective only, if and when both 
France and Germany make one operational division with three brigades each and the 
necessary complementary troops for support and supply available, ready for opera-
tional employment with mobile command and control, long range air transportation, 
mobile air defence assets and logistics packages for air transport, all in interoperability 
modes and with considerable standardisation at least for the use of ammunition and 
fuel, electric aggregates and communications equipments. The troops would have to Lothar Rühl 
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be trained in compatible skills and tactics (one of the major deficiencies the US forces 
observed in their European Nato allies in Bosnia since 1995 was the inability to use 
US-compatible equipments in communications and American transmission formats, 
language, ciphers, etc as generals Joulwan and Clark noted). 
A European Air Transport Command, Reconnaissance, Strategic Intelligence and A s-
sessment Command and Control of EU forces as common functions with common 
organisations - all force goals already envisaged by the WEU before 1995 - are to con-
tribute to the upgrading of real “European options“ for crisis response. The general 
rule is a “single set of forces“ for Nato and EU, as 14 of the 15 EU partners participat-
ing in the planned joint crisis response capability are bound in the Nato military coop-
eration with its long-existing force goal planning process. However, a separate force 
planning subject is evacuation of people in emergency situations beyond the opera-
tional search and rescue, since Nato does not plan  for emergency evacuation of civil-
ians on a large scale as a military function (it has, however, accomplished this task by 
improvising in March/April 1991 between Northern Iraq and Southern Turkey in the 
Kurdish contingency). 
3. Force structuring for crisis response is by nature provisional and must be as flexible 
as possible to adapt to changing contingencies and situations on the ground. The EU 
and Nato have identified 149 different operational capabilities to meet the various 
challenges posed be the three main generic tasks of humanitarian assistance, conflict 
prevention and interposition of troops for forceful separation of opponents in a crisis 
situation with armed violence threatening or having already occurred. The 115.000 
soldiers of the land or ground forces will have to be divided into various operational 
components, in “packages“ for the various identifiable contingencies. Since never 
more than one expeditionary force of up to 60.000 soldiers shall be deployed on the 
ground in one contingency and this for up to 12 months, on call for readiness within 
60 days, the 115.000 force level offers several options for rotation in deployment: on 
average either three times 35-40.000 for four months or up to 55.000 in two periods of 
six months each. The force packages could be smaller,  i.e. 15-20.000, which would 
leave an operational ready reserve with three contingencies covered at the same time. 
These figures show that the force structure should be extremely flexible, in order to 
lend itself to rapid adaptation of “packages tailored“ to given situations with limited 
tasks in each case. If, however, one large operation were to become necessary, such as 
Bosnia in 1995-96 or Macedonia-Kosovo in 1999, the authorised expeditionary force 
of up to 60.000 strong would  have to be used. In this case it would have to be de-
ployed to the theatre for the time necessary up to 12 months without relief or rotation, 
unless ready reserves stood by. The 115.000 overall level for land forces in the EU 
crisis reaction corps would probably allow such a stretched-out deployment, if the 
logistical support and the money to pay were on hand. But Bosnia and Kosovo with Structures, possibilities and limits of Europe 
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Macedonia show that the required time for peace-keeping or even more for peace-
making may well last longer than the allotted 12 months. This is even likely in such 
cases, where international forces would be inserted into an crisis area with the mission 
of either to keep the adversaries apart or to enforce the peace by offensive deploy-
ments for control, which is implicit in the “Petersberg Tasks“.  
4. In such cases, the development of the situation can change both the mission and the 
required forces or quality, equipment, operational capabilities of the forces. This hap-
pened in Somalia and in Bosnia between 1992 and 1994: In Somalia from protection 
of the humanitarian assistance via transport and distribution of relief goods and other 
aid (which had become objects of competition between rivals in the ethnic civil war 
for the control of the territory by control of hungry populations and at the same time 
prizes of looting by banditism) to the needy to suppression of banditism and finally 
enforcement of UN decisions with the attempt of disarming warring factions, hunting 
“war lords“ and securing control of the territory by force and  occupation. In Bosnia 
with a similar development from simple watching over demarcation lines, to protect-
ing relief convoys and individuals, opening blocked roads, guarding abandoned vil-
lages or towns, creating UN proclaimed “safe havens“ for refugees and defending (or 
rather not really defending) such areas as Szrebrenica or Tuzla (abandoned with the 
people to the Serbs). In the end in 1995, the UN “Protection Force“ did not discharge 
its responsibilities and could not even help itself , not even with Nato  air cover, b e-
cause of the lack of heavy arms, armoured transport helicopters for mobility over 
longer distances and a UN mandate with appropriate rules of engagement to open fire 
not only when under attack but also to protect villages or traffic on the road and gener-
ally to carry out their missions with the use of force. The result was general helpless-
ness and disorientation, loss of time and effort, high cost for no re-turn in security. The 
Canadian soldiers of UNPROFOR chained to bridges or gates of military installations 
of the Bosnian Serbs as living shields to deter Nato air attacks and artillery fire be- 
fore the late summer of 1995 were the sorry symbol ??? of international incapacity to 
cope with the problems and master the crisis. The Dutch battalion handing over Szre-
brenica, one of the “safe havens“ held open for Bosnian refugees, with several thou-
sands of civilians to the Serb military of general Mladevic, since wanted as a “war 
criminal“, was the more dramatic symbol of this incapacity. 
In the end, the UN soldiers stood in the way for Nato air attacks and Nato ground de-
ployments such as the insertion of the allied rapid reaction force close to Sarajevo to 
counter the Serb artillery fire barrages. The conversion of such troops to a fighting 
force is possible, but not always and everywhere under all circumstances. In the Bos-
nian case, part of the UNPROFOR elements were upgraded in arms and equipment for 
enlarged missions including readiness for combat, in other cases they were replaced by 
fresh Nato f orces from Europe. In general terms Nato first stood in for the UN, where Lothar Rühl 
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it was allowed to do this, then replaced the UN forces for the occupation and control 
of Bosnia. The change-over meant the end of the UN military presence in Bosnia and 
marked the beginning of a cooperation between Nato and the UN under the opera-
tional and physical control of Nato with first about 50-60.000 allied soldiers in the 
Ifor/Sfor. By the year 2001 the level of Sfor has been reduced to about 33 % of the 
original one. Bosnia h as been, at least on the surface and for the most, been pacified 
without further bloodshed or armed violence on a recognisable scale. Is the replace-
ment of the UN force by Nato the model on which the EU bases is provisional crisis 
respond for peace-enforcement with the use of strong and active military force? 
5. The official German interpretation of the Helsinki and Nice EU documents men-
tions that “only possible developments of a crisis will tell, whether the EU or Nato will 
act militarily“ and that therefore „consultation and cooperation“ between the two o r-
ganisations constitute “a key function“, i.e. “in times of crisis“, in order “to involve the 
alliance comprehensively in the decision-making process, which can lead to an EU 
operation“. The American partners did ask during the last years, whether this could 
mean that US forces might be called in belatedly to finish off the business started by 
the Europeans? This is, of course, one of the key questions, that the US Congress 
would ask in the course of events, leading to a request by the EU or European Nato 
allies for US forces in a European contingency. Here lies one of the reasons for the 
obvious American scepticism vis-à-vis European crisis control operations, although 
the US has for a long time demanded such European capabilities to deal with Euro-
pean contingencies without calling in US forces until they would be really needed. The 
ambivalence of the American debate and official policy on this matter reflects the am-
biguity of such crisis situations and their incalculable evolution, for which the situa-
tion in Southern Serbia bordering on Kosovo and on Macedonia gave an example in 
the spring of the year 2001 with the Albanian violence breaking out in that region. 
6. Such possibilities point to the critical nature of force structuring and armaments for 
crisis response, conflict prevention and termination as well as to the inherent and 
mostly hidden risks of “incrementalism“ in deploying and engaging forces in order not 
to intervene too soon too heavy-handed  and to keep all the options open for controlled 
escalation and de-escalation. The old French adage “qui peut le plus peut le moins“, 
meaning that he who can do more, can also do less - but not vice versa. In other words: 
Larger and better armed forces can be used successfully in different ways than smaller 
and lighter ones, when the tide changes and new challenges arise. Force structuring for 
crisis response must therefore create adaptable force components for various combina-
tions, which allow different options, above all a spectrum of options by changes in the 
composition of rapidly available elements, without having to exchange whole force 
structures or field formations such as brigades and divisions (in Bosnia Ifor was com-
posed in 1996 of three allied divisions with several brigades each, under the command Structures, possibilities and limits of Europe 
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of the then British-led ARRC from ACE). The “Head Quarters“ structure adopted by 
Nato offers the ad- vantage of various elements to be inserted into one frame and i n-
terchanged  in the course of the operation without a general change-over and loss of 
continuity. The EU structure has adopted this system, which also makes it easier to 
cooperate with Nato and change operational responsibilities in the theatre. 
The latest example of the reality on the ground changing rapidly and by surprise was 
the rebellion of Macedonian Albanians on the border of Kosovo around the town of 
Tetovo, where on March 14, 2001 a group of the newly organised Macedonian-
Albanian UCK  opened fire on the positions of the Macedonian army and border po-
lice, collocated with 1200 German soldiers of the former international “Extraction 
Force“ for an emergency evacuation of the OSCE observers from Kosovo still under 
Serb control in 1998 before the outbreak of the Kosovo war. This German contingent 
and other international elements were held in reserve for the logistical supply and pos-
sible reinforcement of the German sector in the South Kosovo since the Kfor deploy-
ment in June 1999. They had not seen any action or been under hostile fire until mid-
March 2001: All of a sudden they found themselves on the front of a beginning fire 
fight across the border with mortar impacts close to their barracks. 200 of them were 
immediately withdrawn back to security and German Leopard tanks were deployed 
from Kosovo to the Tetovo garrison in Macedonia as a back-up by heavy armour and 
as deterrence of aggression by what the German defence minister Rudolf Scharping 
called “Albanian terrorists“
6. His troops in Tetovo were garrisoned in a Macedonian 
border town with an Albanian majority population and situated between three different 
“UCK“ guerrilla forces: The one in Kosovo, a second one in the Presovo region of 
South Serbia and a new one near the border in Macedonia - quite an unforeseen situa-
tion two years earlier, w hen the international force had been deployed to Northern 
Macedonia, a country with one quarter to one third of its population being Albanian-
Muslim. 
A few days earlier, US troops had to open fire in the South Serbian Presovo valley 
border sector to Kosovo on UCK partisans in order to restore security. A cease-fire 
was negotiated with the UCK groups in Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovic under the 
monitoring surveillance by a Joint Security Force Headquarters at Bujanovic. Later the 
Yugoslav army was allowed back in regimental strength into this border region, a 5 
km wider buffer zone, to maintain order. With the returning troops came general Ne-
bosja Pavkovic, former commander of the Yugoslav army corps in Kosovo during the 
conflict of 1999  - a 180 degree change in the political situation on the terrain as well 
as between Nato and Belgrade, due to the UCK activities in South Serbia and to the 
change of power in Yugoslavia (general Pavkovic, however, was one of the leading 
supporters of Milosevic in the Yugoslav army). Lothar Rühl 
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Both new contingencies demonstrated the need for international insertion forces to 
always be prepared for a sudden deterioration of conditions and crises concerning their 
missions, which might then be changed from one day to the other, with even the oppo-
nent changing: The assumption, widely made since 1991, that forces for crisis man-
agement and peace-keeping, in particular for „preventive deployments“ like the origi-
nal one to Macedonia, do not need heavy arms such as artillery and even less offensive 
means such as armour and armoured combat helicopters, let alone fighter-bombers to 
accomplish their missions, but should be lightly armed as to be inoffensive and highly 
mobile for policing their sector and inspiring confidence in the populations, reducing 
tensions between adversaries, has again been proved wrong by these events. Heavy 
arms, especially armour, artillery and combat helicopters are essential to military secu-
rity even in a stationary defensive posture of international “stabilisation forces“ such 
as Sfor in Bosnia, Kfor in the Kosovo or the international back-up force in Macedonia.  
7. This requirement limits the necessary structural changes of security forces com-
pared to de-fence forces in Europe. The answer to the problem posed does not lie in an 
alternative “light“ instead of “heavy“ or in the dubious distinction between “offensive“ 
and “defensive“ but in striking a proper balance between both types of equipment, 
capabilities, hence force structures and force levels. It stands to reason that m ore 
infantry is needed, but so are airborne and heliported combat units with engineers, 
signal and medical components and light highly mobile armoured units to accompany 
the infantry, which itself must also be mounted on light armoured and wheeled combat 
vehicles and battle-field transportation. The heavy armour must still be available at 
short distances as back-up and fire support in case of need. The training and mental 
preparation of the soldiers has to take into account the various contingencies which 
may arise during a mission and prepare the troops for more than one kind of service in 
the field. But the idea, that an entire “new type“ of “light“ military force, bordering on 
the para-military police could replace the existing force structures, at least  below the 
division level, is an illusion. Brigades may be composed of a mix of light and heavy 
battalions with artillery. Or each battalion may have two light companies an one heav-
ier company with some field artillery support and light armour, but in addition the 
heavier armoured and armed fighting vehicles of the mechanised infantry and a r-
moured battalions with their medium or heavy main battle tanks must be deployed 
with the lighter units as an insurance against a bad day. The combination can be opti-
mal a t brigade or combat group level. Several variants are possible and flexible force 
structures with flexible command and control permit changes in the composition of the 
battalions for special purposes and for the adaptation to changing contingencies and 
missions of the same units. 
 
6  See Mathias Rüb, Report from Tetovo, In: FAZ 17.03.2001, pp. 1, 3. Structures, possibilities and limits of Europe 
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8. The programme of the German army for a new, brigade-oriented structure of the 
land forces with two mobile divisional headquarters for command and control of func-
tional force elements or “tailored packages“ in specific deployments for specific mis-
sions, each capable of commanding  and supporting three to four brigades or brigade-
size combat groups in international security contingencies, the whole laid out for up to 
150.000 soldiers, in Nato roles and for non-Nato roles with an EU force, an OSCE  
force or an UN force, shows the way to go beyond the narrow limits of the 1992 “Pe-
tersberg Tasks“, if the need to do so, were to arise. 
The pledged German contingent to the EU crisis reaction corps of 115.000 soldiers in 
land forces for the crisis deployment of up to 60.000 in one contingency mission and 
one year at 60 days notice on call, would be composed of a total of some 18.000 sol-
diers: 
• one “nucleus“ operational joint headquarters for army, navy and air force components 
in joint command and control, 
• land forces component: 
-  around 14.000 soldiers land forces  
-  available within 5 to 30 days, 
-  one “nucleus“ land component command or headquarters for the ground forces 
in the deployment area/area of operations ( the German-Dutch corps is ear-
marked as a future “crisis reaction corps“ in Allied Forces Europe of Nato), 
-  a division headquarters with supply and support troops for one division, 
-  a brigade headquarters with 6 combat battalions plus supply and support units 
for the brigade, 
• air force component: 
-  “nucleus“ air component command or headquarters to command the air force 
units in the area of operations 
-  around 6.000 soldiers, 
-  available in 5 to 10 days,    
-  6 combat squadrons with 79 aircraft, 
-  8 squadrons (companies) of ground-to-air defence systems, 
-  air transport and general support units, Lothar Rühl 
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• naval component: 
-  “nucleus“ maritime component command or headquarters to command the n a-
val forces in the area of operations and control other maritime movements, 
-  around 4.000 soldiers,  
-  available in 2 to 20 days, 
-  15 combat vessels, 
-  1 naval combat air squadron with 12 aircraft, 
-  maritime surveillance assets and units, 
-  support forces, 
-  central medical service: 
-  around 2.800 soldiers, 
-  available in 20 to 30 days, 
-  2 field hospitals, 
-  6 medical rescue centers, 
-  1 sea-based medical installation (hospital ship), 
-  joint forces base service: 
-  around 3.500 soldiers, 
-  available in 20 to 30 days, 
-  national logistic support elements, 
-  reconnaissance and military intelligence elements.  
 
The German example shows  that with less then 20.000 military personnel, one Euro-
pean country could fill a third of the bill for the 60.000 strong European crisis reaction 
force component in one contingency mission. This means that if conditions and avail-
ability as well as sustainability were equal in all three countries, Britain, France and 
Germany with about 20.000 soldiers each in “tailored packages“ on the German 
model, could field the 60.000 soldiers in operational units with their organic support 
and above with the necessary general support and headquarters organisation for m o-
bile command and control, ground-to air defence, communications and transport, air 
cover, air transport, sea-lift and general logistics including the home base installations 
and assets within 30 days. This consideration leads to the conclusion, that there would 
be at least a second possible multinational force package of another 60.000 soldiers 
within in 30 days for a period of up to 12 months, if all the other participating EU Structures, possibilities and limits of Europe 
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partners would field their national contributions on this model, of course of varying 
personnel and equipment strength. Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and Portugal could 
certainly do that, Poland, Czechia and Hungary as EU candidates and associates could 
contribute, as they all do in Bosnia to Sfor and in Kosovo to Kfor under Nato com-
mand and control. Turkey offers to contribute as it does with two battalions to Sfor 
under Nato authority in Bosnia. 
What Austria and the two Nordic EU members Sweden and Finland would do in a 
serious crisis with regard to the deployment of a EU force with an offensive or at least 
active military mission is not certain and would depend on the circumstances and the 
domestic political constellation. But all three countries have participated in UN peace-
keeping operations with military elements, Sweden with Norway, Denmark and 
Finland has integrated small Baltic units in a “Nordic battalion“ in Sfor after having 
contributed to UN forces for several decades as the other Scandinavian countries and 
Finland. Denmark is not part of the ESDI and does not participate in the common se-
curity and defence policy. Norway, still not a member of EU, is free as a Nato ally to 
contribute or abstain. The decisions of all of these countries probably will be taken 
case by case on the merits of each case in their respective national perception. 
Therefore the strength and composition of the European crisis reaction corps and its 
deployable force components should not pose any real problem within 6 to 12 months 
and within a limited European-Mediterranean dimension. However, six months peri-
ods of service in a crisis situation, as currently in the Balkans, may pose problems of 
sustainability and require rotation of personnel and equipment, if not of entire units. 
Volunteers may not always be in abundance. Professional soldiers of high quality may 
sometimes be in short supply. The equipment has to be maintained and repaired, 
which means exchanged according to its having been used on rough terrain or in com-
bat. Whatever the plans and rules, the real-time utility d epends on the way, soldiers 
and equipment are being employed and cared for. If the EU were to assume the entire 
responsibility for the stability of the Balkans with its own means, including the mili-
tary security function, the 60.000 limit for personnel at one time in one single deploy-
ment would have to be raised by at least half, probably doubled to 120.000. Since 
115.000 soldiers in land forces are the total agreed upon, even this force goal could be 
met for one year; afterwards rotation of units and personnel in headquarters and ser-
vices in the operational area would definitely have to begin. But with this maximum, 
which would allow for either two successive deployments of 60.000 each for two 
times six months  or of three at 40.000 for a rotation over one  year, the human re-
sources would be stretched to the extreme sustainable. The Chief of the German D e-
fence Staff (Inspector General of the Bundeswehr), general Harald Kujat, is on record 
since March 2001 with the public warning that the limits of the personnel reserves for 
crisis deployment of German units have been reached with what is now in the Balkans. Lothar Rühl 
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The European crisis response possibilities are therefore not as grand as it may appear 
by mere counting of the numbers of military personnel in service in  all EU member 
states. The cost of such deployments is such that two billion D -Mark have been set 
aside annually in the defence budget to cover such operations. The amount may just be 
adequate, as long as there is no large and continuous expenditure of ordnance and fuel 
and no mounting repair requirements are to be expected by wear and tear in the field. 
But already, the ministry of finance in Berlin has sent an inspection to the Balkans in 
order to find out, whether it is „necessary“ to offer 180 D-Mark a day to every soldier 
serving there. Pay is directly linked to motivation and hence to volunteers to go into a 
crisis zone. This is treacherous ground for bureaucrats with only the budget in mind 
and inexperienced in looking at risks, hardship and hazards associated with service 
outside the office. This example shows again, how necessary it is, to engage the 
budget directors of the ministries of finance directly, systematically and personally in 
the planning for and the funding of crisis reaction policies in  the service of interna-
tional security. 
9. In the general view, autonomous EU operations without reliance on Nato would 
rather be the exception, EU operations relying on Nato assets (bases, force structures, 
capabilities) and procedures, the general rule. T his is the basic concept adopted at Hel-
sinki and elaborated at Nice by the EU partners. However, the Balkan experience since 
1991 shows that such assumptions, while reasonable and practical, may have given 
way in meeting the realities of a theatre of conflict. The main problem does lie with 
the air cover, surveillance from the air and air-space control,  air transport, armed and 
armoured helicopters, strategic-operational reconnaissance and intelligence,  real-time 
operational information, navigation and identification of locations, all satellite-based, 
finally with night-fighting capabilities of aircraft and armour on the ground. Nato can 
offer assets, the EU has few. In Bosnia in 1995-96 most of the communications, navi-
gation and information assets were US (above 90 %).  It is in this critical and costly 
domain, that the EU partners will have to prove their abilities to carry out their inten-
tions and sustain their efforts over time. 
III.  Harmony within the alliance, compatibility with 
US forces and the issue of a “European Army“ in 
the future 
The quarrel with Ankara over Turkish participation in EU peace support and crisis 
response operations is but one aspect of the problem posed: How can the European 
Security and Defence Identity and the exercise of a European  security and defence 
policy by EU crisis response with military force be made compatible with Nato r e-
quirements in a crisis? How can the EU and the US with the rest of the European allies Structures, possibilities and limits of Europe 
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make satisfactory agreements of practical value and be efficient both outside and i n-
side Nato? How can “the single set of forces“ for EU and Nato of the European allies 
be used to mutual satisfaction in the perception of the best interest of both Europe and 
the alliance? 
All US forces in and earmarked for Europe have out-of-area contingency priorities. 
All operational European forces in Nato will have at least some non-Nato missions 
envisaged for them in international security contingencies. Ten years after the end of 
the East-West confrontation in Europe and of the Soviet  Union, this new priority-
setting is normal and indeed unavoidable. The creation of the European crisis reaction 
corps within the limits set by the EU governments seems to be a reasonable response 
to the new needs and challenges, but also to the long-standing American demand for 
more European efforts in the field of security and defence.  
“Collective defence“ behind the border-lines of the Nato parameter with a firm posture 
of forces in Europe has given way to “collective security“ as the immediate concern 
and the first priority as long as there occurs no new appearance of a direct military 
threat in Europe against Nato. Turkey lies on the border between European defence 
and international security in an area of unrest and potential threats around the Euro-
pean periphery, including against Europe itself from the South. Hence the Nato area is 
unevenly e xposed to security hazards from its environment running from the Caucasus 
and the Black Sea via Central Asia and the Middle East along the Southern coast of 
the Mediterranean to the Maghreb in North Africa. But this wide “Southern arc of ten-
sions“ , which englobes Europe and the entire Mediterranean, also marks the larger 
strategic-geopolitical unity of this valuable, unevenly populated and developed world 
region, s panning three continents and bordering on two oceans in the South and in the 
West: The Indian Ocean and the North Atlantic. As Nato and the EU expand to the 
East on the European continent and come closer to Russia, the European security 
agenda changes and  with it the scope, scale and strategic significance of “collective 
defence“ by Nato in Europe. Will the Baltic and the Black Sea become - in strategic-
political terms  – “Nato lakes“ as the Mediterranean has become over time in the last 
fifty years inspite  of the fact, probably strange in the classical perception of Admiral 
Mahan, that Nato does not control the opposite coast in North Africa, at least not with 
naval and air bases and certainly not politically? Will the environment around Europe 
remain stable or will the volatile situation escalate into permanent danger? The answer 
to this question lies in the possible understandings with Russia, in Russia’s position in 
the Caucasus, in Georgia’s relations with Nato and in Turkey’s relations with Russia, 
with  Syria, Israel and Egypt, ultimately with America’s position in the Middle East 
between Israel, its client, and the Arab world, hostile to the existence of the Jewish 
State as the dominant regional power with still colonial features on Arab land. Half a 
dozen countries in the region have missiles of ranges reaching Southern Europe, mis-Lothar Rühl 
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sile technology and possibly the nuclear weapons o ption plus a part in the spread of 
other dangerous means of mass destruction. 
In this situation the defence of the European Nato perimeter changes its strategic 
meaning: Defence in the strategic sense must be forward defence beyond the perimeter 
of the Nato area by the means and strategy of denial of aggressive options against 
Europe and the American presence in the region. The requirements for such a strategy, 
both political-economic and military, are stabilising forces on the periphery and orga-
nizing mutual political support based on common security and interests. What role 
could a separate “autonomous“ European crisis reaction  force play under such condi-
tions in this specific peripheral environment and what role, that Nato with US leader-
ship could not play?  What will be the strategic objectives of the autonomous Euro-
pean security policy and could they be achieved in “strategic autonomy“. How will the 
EU governments define their common long-term and immediate security interests for 
example vis-à-vis Turkey, a “strategic partner“ both for the US and Europe, and how 
vis-à-vis Israel? In order to use crisis response forces anywhere, the EU must first 
have a clear view of the political picture and the strategic conditions for the use of 
force or for “preventive deployments“ of a peace-keeping force to a crisis situation. 
This was neither the case in Somalia nor in the Balkans, although the disintegration of 
Yugoslavia in a series of wars, which were each a combination between a civil war of 
ethnic-religious as well as political texture and a war of se-cession on the part of the 
non-Serb peoples, while for Belgrade it was each time a war of domination as well as 
of preserving the political unity of Yugoslavia, forced Europe to attend to the conflict 
in a murky situation. The peace-keeping and peace-enforcement roles could not really 
be assumed let alone played with success without the deployment of superior military 
force and an international mandate to act with force either by the UN or by the OSCE 
(the latter still being subject to authorisation by the UN WSR). This meant that it could 
not be played against Russia’s resistance at the UN, unless one would forego an inter-
national mandate to use force, as Nato finally resigned itself to do with no other politi-
cal option left. Could the EU have acted in this way and could it have succeeded, even 
to the point of  Nato’s in- complete and precarious success in June 1999 after the Kos-
ovo war? Could it now consolidate the new situation under more favourable circum-
stances than those in early 1999 before Nato intervened with operation “Allied Force“ 
against Serbia/Yugoslavia? The answer is negative  to the first question and dubious to 
the second. 
The general wisdom of European policy-makers after the not yet ended Kosovo con-
flict has been expressed in the summary assumption, that there would not be a repeti-
tion of an interventionist military policy i n the Balkans, of course not in the Caucasus 
or in North Africa and the Middle East: “Allied Force“ against Serbia and the Kfor 
experience, still of an open outcome in political terms, are no model for future Nato Structures, possibilities and limits of Europe 
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and EU policies of crisis management. If t hat is so, what will the consequences be in 
new crises on the periphery of Europe? Service of EU crisis reaction forces in small 
numbers to the OSCE or the UN, which means with Russian con-sent and participation 
in the deployment in any serious contingency in a region,. where Moscow has an i n-
terest, is one possibility. But would the EU members want to do this together with 
Russia and without the US? Would Britain even be prepared to take part in such po-
litical operation without the Americans? Should Germany be prepared to do that and 
risk the adverse political consequences? If such an all-European operation of crisis 
management by “preventive deployment“ to a dangerous region or “insertion“ of 
forces into crisis situations of open violence were decided with  the US and Nato not 
participating, would it then be likely that Washington would allow this with a Russian 
connection of the EU and the use of Nato assets? If it were to the South in the Eastern 
Mediterranean, for example on Cyprus, or in the south-east to the Lower Danube and 
Black Sea or again in the Balkans, would Turkey suffer such a European-Russian 
combination without American control and Nato responsibility? Would Israel, if the 
theatre of crisis management were Lebanon or Palestine, tolerate an all-European i n-
volvement with or without military force, but without US control? While European 
military observers and even interposition forces are welcome to stand watch of demar-
cation and disengagement lines in the Near East between Israeli and Arab forces and 
while such elements have already been d eployed under the UN flag and control, such 
deployments could hardly serve as confidence-building presence if they represented a 
“European“ operation. Israel would a lways insist on a solid US military presence and 
participation in any international set-up. 
Wherever one looks, the political possibilities for a “strategically autonomous“ Euro-
pean security presence or crisis management role, seem to be rather limited - which is, 
what the European governments have always maintained and seem indeed to expect 
from the foreseeable future. But in Washington the picture across the Atlantic looks 
different. In mid-March 2001 US defence secretary Rumsfeld repeated his warning, 
given in February in Munich in the presence of Nato secretary general Robertson, EU 
security and defence high representative Solana and various European defence and 
foreign ministers, by saying to a London newspaper
7 that the American concerns about 
a weakening of Nato by the EU policies were still vivid and the hec ??? would remain 
„vigilant“ as to European policies in this matter and their repercussions on the Atlantic 
alliance. Therefore, it must be assumed, that the problem of harmony in the alliance 
has not yet been solved and not even adequately addressed on both sides of the Atlan-
tic. The EU partners are not united behind the facade of their European Security and 
Defence Identity  - in principle accepted by the US since 1996 - and they do not yet 
have a common perception of the ultimate purpose of their proclaimed European 
 
7  See Daily Telegraph, March 18. Lothar Rühl 
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Common Security and Defence Policy, inspite of all the reassurances offered to the US 
and the alliance, to which they belong. There is a hidden agenda at least in Paris for a 
“European defence“ and the issue of a “European army“ for  the future (expression 
used by French Defence Minister Alain Richard), while still undefined, looms behind 
the rhetoric as it has done for the last three decades in the plans of various political 
ambitions in European capitals, especially in Paris. 
The idea of a European army is not accredited in Berlin or in the Hague and it is 
openly countered in London with the Blair government clearly in disfavour as are the 
Conservatives. This ambiguous concept of “European army“, refused by Britain but 
still propagated in France, and the equally ambivalent and not plausible concept of a 
“European defence“ by the Europeans in “strategic autonomy“ (also a French concept 
vis-à-vis the US) will continue, if not swiftly abandoned and laid to rest, to confound 
and frustrate  alliance politics without any advantage to Europe’s autonomy, strategic 
or otherwise, nor to a real EU capability for meaningful military crisis response in 
international security support inside or outside Nato, with or without US participation 
and with or without “Russia on board“.  
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